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No Good Options: Picking Up the Pieces After
King v. Burwell
Nicholas Bagley & David K. Jones
in t r o d u c t io n
If the Supreme Court rules against the government in King v. Burwell,1
insurance subsidies available under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will
evaporate in the thirty-four states that have refused to establish their own
health-care exchanges.2 The pain could be felt within weeks. Without
subsidies, an estimated eight or nine million people stand to lose their health
coverage.3 Because sicker people will retain coverage at a much higher rate than
healthier people, insurance premiums in the individual market will surge by as
much as fifty percent.4
Policymakers will come under intense pressure to mitigate the fallout from
a government loss in King. But the Republican-controlled Congress has already
ruled out a surgical fix,5 and recent reporting suggests that Congress will be
hard-pressed to develop an alternative reform proposal that could meet with

1.

No. 14-114 (argued Mar. 4, 2015).

2.

State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org
/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types [http://perma.cc
/4D6V-JYXF].

3.

Linda J. Blumberg et al., The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding for the Plaintiff in King
vs. Burwell: 8.2 Million More Uninsured and 35% Higher Premiums, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND. & URBAN INST. 4 (2015), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports
/issue_briefs/2015/rwjf417289 [http://perma.cc/J8TD-ZCZZ] (estimating that eliminating
subsidies would increase the rolls of the uninsured by 8.2 million); Evan Saltzman &
Christine Eibner, The Effect of Eliminating the Affordable Care Act’s Tax Credits in Federally
Facilitated Marketplaces, RAND CORP. (2015), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR980/RAND_RR980.pdf [http://perma.cc/9AS7-RLX4]
(estimating an enrollment decline of 9.6 million).

4.

Saltzman & Eibner, supra note 3, at 1.

5.

Louise Radnofsky, Republicans To Block Legislative Fix to Health-Care Law, WALL ST. J., Jan.
29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-to-block-legislative-fix-to-health-care
-law-1422575627 [http://perma.cc/A9AF-4GCA].
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the White House’s approval.6 Even a temporary extension will meet with fierce
resistance from legislators who will see an extension as a tacit concession that
the subsidies, in some form, are here to stay.
All eyes will turn to the Obama administration and to the states. Yet public
debate about their post-King options has been limited. Part of the reason is
strategic: the government’s supporters fear that discussing fixes might signal
to the Supreme Court that eliminating the subsidies would not do much
damage. The Obama administration, for example, has declined to tell Congress
whether it even has a contingency plan.7 And while the ACA’s opponents
suggest that the King aftermath might not be so bad, they have generally
declined to endorse specific fallback plans.
In this Essay, we take a hard look at some potential options available both
to the administration and to the states to mitigate the fallout of a government
defeat in King. Some are straightforward and noncontroversial; others will face
intense political resistance and press up against legal boundaries. Taken
together, we believe these options might enable policymakers to moderate, at
least somewhat, the consequences of a government loss in King.
Even under the most optimistic scenario, however, millions of people will
still lose their health coverage and the market for individual insurance in many
states will still collapse. Vague claims that the administration has some sort of
“fix” up its sleeve or that the states can snap their fingers and establish
exchanges are, in our view, irresponsible. In the long run, of course, all but a
few holdout states might establish their own exchanges, and Congress could
always intervene down the line. In the near term, however, there are no good
options: just halfway measures and ill-fitting patches.
This Essay first examines possible responses from the Obama
administration and, in particular, addresses three questions: Could the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) decline to require taxpayers to pay back subsidies,
provided through refundable tax credits, which were improperly paid out
under the IRS rule? What could the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) do to make it easier for uncooperative states to transition to
state-based exchanges? And does HHS have the legal power to say that states
performing certain exchange functions have established an exchange, even if
the states have not formally elected to do so?
The Essay then turns to the states, which will confront immediate
difficulties if they wish to create their own exchanges. Time is short: the

6.

Sahil Kapur, Republicans Are at a Loss on What To Do If SCOTUS Nixes Obamacare Subsidies,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com
/dc/republican-response-king-burwell-obamacare [http://perma.cc/LZ9E-WEDU].

7.

GOP Senator: HHS Chief’s Answers ‘Contemptuous’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/02/04/us/politics/ap-us-congress-health-overhaul
.html [http://perma.cc/6FEJ-QABM].
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enrollment period for 2016 coverage begins on November 1, 2015, a scant four
months after the Supreme Court is likely to rule. States trying to create an
exchange will have almost no time to do what took other states many years to
accomplish. By the time the Court rules, only eight of the thirty-four states
with a federally run exchange are likely to have legislatures that are still in
session.8 Calling a special session in most of the remaining states will be
politically impossible. Those states that wish to create an exchange should
begin now to plan for a quick transition. In particular, they should train their
attention on three core challenges: securing legal authority to operate a statebased exchange; developing the capacity to perform the functions of an
exchange; and financing new state-based exchanges.
t h e o b a m a a d m in is t r a t io n
Could the administration decline to claw back tax credits?
If the Court invalidates the IRS rule at issue in King, those who purchased
coverage through the federally facilitated exchanges will be in a tough spot.
Under the ACA, their insurers will already have received “advance payment tax
credits” from the IRS on their behalf. At tax time, the IRS is supposed to
reconcile those advance payments with the tax credits that the purchaser is
entitled to under the ACA.9 Since purchasers would not have received any tax
credits but for the unlawful IRS rule, they would, in the normal course, have to
pay back the amount that was improperly disbursed to their insurers.
The administration has the legal flexibility to avoid that harsh result.
Under 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b)(8), the IRS can choose whether to give “retroactive
effect” to a court decision or instead to apply that decision only in the future.10
Pursuant to this authority, the IRS could issue a rule specifying that
individuals could properly claim tax credits, based on their annual income, for
8.

Nicholas Bagley, David K. Jones & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Predicting the Fallout from King v.
Burwell—Exchanges and the ACA, 372 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 101, 102 (2015).

9.

26 U.S.C. § 36B(f) (2012).

10.

26 U.S.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2012); see also Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739,
748 n.4 (2004) (“Nothing we hold today requires the IRS to revisit the tax-exempt status in
past years of plans that were amended in reliance on [a mistaken IRS manual] . . . The
Internal Revenue Code gives the Commissioner discretion to decline to apply decisions of
this Court retroactively.”); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm’r, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957)
(holding that an earlier version of § 7805(b)(8) “confirmed the authority of the
Commissioner to correct any ruling, regulation or Treasury decision retroactively, but
empowered him, in his discretion, to limit retroactive application to the extent necessary to
avoid inequitable results”); IBM Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 919 (Ct. Cl. 1965)
(“Implicit in the permission to make tax rulings prospective is Congressional authorization
not to collect taxes, for the past period, which would otherwise be required by substantive
taxing provisions of the internal revenue legislation.”).
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the period until the Supreme Court’s decision takes effect. (For the 2015 tax
year, tax credits would have to be pro-rated.) If the IRS were to issue such a
rule, it would not need to claw back tax credits that were disbursed to
taxpayers prior to the Court’s decision in King.
Could the administration make it easier for states to establish exchanges?
Looking forward, the administration might try to clear the way for states
with federally facilitated exchanges to transition to state-based exchanges.
Although a few of the requirements for creating a state-based exchange are
statutory, most are contained in regulations or in an HHS “Blueprint” for
establishing a state-based exchange.11 HHS could try to relax some of these
requirements.
There is a threshold question, however: does the ACA even permit states to
receive tax credits on newly established state exchanges? Tax credits are linked
to “an Exchange established by the State under 1311.”12 But the ACA provides,
in section 1311, that “[e]ach State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish
an American Health Benefit Exchange.”13 Does a state exchange established
after January 1, 2014, count as an exchange “established under 1311”?
The answer appears to be yes. The 2014 deadline is best understood not as
a limitation on state authority, but as the date by which HHS had to create an
exchange in any state that failed to establish one. As the Supreme Court has
explained, courts do not “construe[] a provision that the Government ‘shall’
act within a specified time, without more, as a jurisdictional limit precluding
action later.”14 And apart from the deadline itself, nothing in the statute
suggests that Congress meant to strip states of the power to establish subsidyeligible exchanges after January 1, 2014. Indeed, such an interpretation would
raise serious federalism concerns: the ACA would not only have put states to
the difficult choice of whether to establish an exchange or forgo tax credits, but
would have also disabled states from ever reconsidering that choice.15

11.

Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Blueprint for Approval of Affordable State-based and
State Partnership Insurance Exchanges, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Nov.
16, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/hie-blueprint-11162012
.pdf [http://perma.cc/W3E9-E396] [hereinafter Blueprint].

12.

26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).

13.

42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also § 18041(b) (providing that, “not
later than January 1, 2014,” a state that “elects” to establish an exchange must “adopt and
have in effect” certain federal or state standards).

14.

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158 (2003).

15.

Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (holding that any
“condition on the grant of federal moneys” must be imposed “unambiguously”).

16

no good options: picking up the pieces after king v. burwell

The courts will instead ask whether the statute contains “less drastic
remedies” for failure to hit a deadline.16 And the ACA does include a less drastic
remedy: in any state that failed to establish its own exchange by January 1,
2014, the Secretary of HHS had to step in and establish an exchange on the
state’s behalf. The ACA does not purport to further punish the states. Several
statutory provisions reinforce the point. Under section 1321(b), for example, a
state that elects to establish an exchange must adopt certain federal and state
standards “not later than January 1, 2014.”17 But a state’s refusal to do so just
triggers the Secretary’s obligation, under section 1321(c), to act on the state’s
behalf.18 It would be anomalous to construe section 1321, which is titled “[s]tate
flexibility in operation and enforcement of Exchanges,” to impose an
irreversible, one-time decision on the states.19
The states thus could transition from federally facilitated exchanges to
subsidy-eligible state-based exchanges. HHS, in turn, could take steps to ease
that transition. First and foremost, HHS’s transition rule requires a state to
have an exchange approved (or conditionally approved) 6.5 months in advance
of launching operations.20 To accommodate states that seek to establish
exchanges for January 2016, HHS could adopt an interim rule to push back the
deadline.21
Even with extended deadlines, as we explore below, there may still be
inadequate time in many states to establish exchanges. In recognition of these
time constraints, HHS could revise its 2016 Blueprint to enable states to launch

16.

Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986) (“We would be most reluctant to conclude
that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency
action, especially when important public rights are at stake. When, as here, there are less
drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts should not assume
that Congress intended the agency to lose its power to act.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145, 154-57 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying
Brock); Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying
Brock).

17.

42 U.S.C. § 18041(b) (2012).

18.

Id. § 18041(c).

19.

Id. § 18041; see also Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 160 (“Congress was presumably aware that we do
not readily infer congressional intent to limit an agency’s power to get a mandatory job done
merely from a specification to act by a certain time.”).

20.

42 C.F.R. § 155.106(a)(2) (2012); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS
Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2015, 79 Fed. Reg. 13,744, 13,792 (Mar. 11,
2014) (to be codified in scattered sections of 45 C.F.R.) (explaining HHS’s March 2014
reduction of the approval time from one year to 6.5 months in order to “give States more
time prior to approval of the Exchange Blueprint to prepare for the transition from an FFE
or State Partnership Exchange model to a State Exchange”).

21.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012) (authorizing an agency to dispense with notice and
comment if the agency “for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest”).
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their exchanges mid-year. Nothing in the ACA or its governing regulations
appears to preclude HHS from doing so. Although the open-enrollment
periods for 2016 have been set, the ACA authorizes HHS to establish special
enrollment periods when potential enrollees “meet such exceptional conditions
. . . as the Secretary may provide.”22 The invalidation of the IRS’s tax credit
rule would surely qualify as an exceptional circumstance, enabling HHS to
create special enrollment periods for 2016 during which states could launch
their exchanges.23
Without question, creating special periods and running mid-year
enrollment would be extremely messy for insurers, regulators, and consumers.
But still other adjustments to the Blueprint could ease the transition to statebased exchanges. Under the Blueprint, for example, state-based exchanges are
permitted to rely on “[f]ederal government services” to perform certain
functions, including the calculation of the tax credits and cost-sharing
subsidies. As we discuss in detail below, the list of functions that state
exchanges could contract out to the federal government could be expanded,
perhaps dramatically.
Could the administration deem some federally-facilitated exchanges to be state
exchanges?
More controversially, the administration might attempt to deem the
federally facilitated exchanges in some uncooperative states to be state-based
exchanges. As it stands, a state exchange can only be established if HHS
receives a declaration letter from the governor confirming the state’s election to
establish an exchange.24 But the ACA does not define what it means for a state
to “establish” an exchange. Instead, the ACA grants the Secretary of HHS the
authority to “issue regulations setting standards . . . with respect to . . . the
establishment and operation of Exchanges.”25 It further emphasizes that a
“State . . . elect[ion]” to establish an exchange can be taken to occur “at such
time and in such manner as the Secretary may prescribe.”26

22.

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(b)(3)(C) (2012) (incorporated by reference into the Affordable Care
Act through 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(6) (2012)).

23.

Cf. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Special Enrollment Period for Individuals Losing
Coverage Through the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Program (PCIP) on April 30, 2014,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.cms
.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/PCIP-bulletin-4-24-14.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3H92-PGG3] (characterizing as an “exceptional circumstance[]” the loss of
coverage arising from the elimination of a high-risk insurance program).

24.

Blueprint, supra note 11, at 6.

25.

42 U.S.C. § 18041(a)(1) (2012).

26.

Id. § 18041(b).
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Given these broad statutory delegations, HHS could revise its regulations
and the Blueprint to provide that some states should be understood as having
established an exchange, even if they never formally elected to do so. Consider,
most notably, the fourteen states that conduct plan management functions for
their federally facilitated exchanges. They include the seven “partnership”
states (AR, DE, IL, IA, MI, NH, and WV) as well as seven others that did not
apply for partnership status (ME, VA, OH, KS, NE, SD, and MT). These
states already perform many of the core functions of an exchange. They are
primarily responsible for certifying whether health plans meet federal
standards for exchange participation; they monitor those health plans to assure
their compliance with those standards; they oversee quality reporting
requirements; and they collect data from the plans on their rates and benefits.27
Could the regular performance of essential and substantial exchange
functions, over time, constitute the establishment of an exchange? As relevant
here, the term “establish” means “[t]o make or form; to bring about or into
existence.”28 Arguably, that act of creation need not be intentional or formal. In
common usage, a consistent practice can be said to constitute the establishment
of whatever that practice entails. “Establish” simply connotes making
something “stable or firm.”29 Just as habits, routes, and norms can be
established over time through a regular course of conduct, so too might states
establish exchanges.
By analogy, the courts have resisted the idea that an employee benefit plan
is only “established” within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) when an employer explicitly elects to establish a plan.30
As one circuit court explained, “[a] formal document designated as ‘the Plan’ is
not required to establish that an ERISA plan exists; otherwise, employers could
avoid federal regulation merely by failing to memorialize their employee
benefit programs in a separate document so designated.”31 When it comes to

27.

Sarah Dash, Christine Monahan & Kevin W. Lucia, Health Policy Brief: Health Insurance
Exchanges and State Decisions, HEALTH AFF. (July 18, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org
/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_96.pdf [http://perma.cc/S87W-AWQX].

28.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2015), http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/establish
[http://perma.cc/CYZ5-P5Q6]
(defining
“establish” as “to bring into existence”). “Establish” can also mean “to put beyond doubt,”
id., but that’s not the sense in which the ACA uses the word.

29.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/64530 [http://
perma.cc/DJQ4-4Y9M] (defining establish in its original sense as meaning “[t]o render
stable or firm”).

30.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012) (defining “employee welfare benefit plan” to mean, in part, “any
plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both”).

31.

Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1990).
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the establishment of a plan, “it is the reality of a plan, fund, or program and
not the decision to extend certain benefits that is determinative.”32
So long as the state’s ongoing activities are, by themselves, sufficient to
constitute the establishment of an exchange, the federal government’s heavy
involvement in exchange operations should be irrelevant. The Supreme Court
has held, for example, that a state can still “establish” telephone rates even
when the federal government sets strict rules governing that ratemaking.33 The
same should arguably hold true here.
To be clear, “establish” need not be read in this flexible manner. The word
is also defined to mean “[t]o fix, settle, institute or ordain permanently, by
enactment or agreement.”34 When it comes to the creation of an entity with legal
personality—like an exchange—this may be the most natural way to
understand the word. That’s especially so given that the ACA speaks in terms
of a state “elect[ion]” to establish an exchange, and distinguishes between the
terms “establish” and “operate”—suggesting that operation, by itself, does not
count as establishment.35 Respect for federalism principles may also cut against
a capacious understanding of “establish.” Because the states were not on notice
that operation of the exchange might be taken to count as establishment,
treating that continued operation as establishment would arguably show
disrespect to the states’ considered choices.36
Nonetheless, the term “establish” may be sufficiently ambiguous to enable
HHS to adopt an interpretation that would capture those states with

32.

Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc); see also Grimo v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Vt., 34 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that an ERISA plan
“is established if from the surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the
intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and procedures for
receiving benefits” (quoting Donovan, 288 F.2d at 1373) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 978 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that an employee
benefit plan had been established in part because the employer “assume[d] some
responsibility for the administration of the program and the payment of benefits”); Brown
v. Ampco–Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that the employer
had established a plan, even as the company denied it).

33.

AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 384 (1999) (“[The carriers’ argument]
attributes to that [rate-setting] task a greater degree of autonomy than the phrase ‘establish
any rates’ necessarily implies . . . It is the States that will apply those standards and
implement that methodology, determining the concrete result in particular circumstances.
That is enough to constitute the establishment of rates.”).

34.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 29 (emphasis added).

35.

42 U.S.C. § 18041(a)(1)(A), (c).

36.

Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Because a state-based
exchange must either be a government agency or a non-profit entity, see 42 U.S.C. §
18041(c)(1), HHS would have to designate the state agency that performs plan management
functions as the state exchange.
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substantial, ongoing exchange-related responsibilities.37 Doing so would
require substantial changes to HHS rules. Since full-dress notice-andcomment rulemaking would take too long to forestall the meltdown of state
insurance markets, HHS would have to issue an interim final rule that would
take effect almost immediately.38 Notice and comment could then occur with
the new rules already in place.
We should emphasize, however, that this “deeming” approach has serious
limits. Most obviously, HHS would be unable to help the many states that
have declined to cooperate with the federally facilitated exchanges. And any
effort to treat some federally facilitated exchanges as state-based exchanges is
sure to meet with a serious legal challenge from those who think the agency has
exceeded its statutory authority. Still, the challenges would take time to play
out. In the meantime, the political conversation in the deemed states would
shift: the question would be not whether to establish a state-based exchange,
but whether to dismantle it.
the states
Although the Obama administration could make it easier for states to
establish their own exchanges, the states will nonetheless face daunting
challenges in doing so. First, they will have to negotiate the political obstacles
to establishing legal authority for the exchanges. In most cases, the necessary
authority will have to come through new legislation, although governors and
other executive branch leaders could act unilaterally in some cases. Second,
states will need to develop the capacity to perform the functions of an
exchange. Given the intense time pressures, the central question will be how
much states can delegate, and to whom. Third, states will have to figure out
how to finance any new exchange—without the federal grants that were once
available to help establish state-based exchanges.
Authority
Legislative Option
First and foremost, a state must have the requisite legal authority to
establish an exchange. A state law authorizing an exchange would be desirable
37.

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that courts should
defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous term in a statute it
administers).

38.

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012) (permitting an agency to issue a rule without notice and
comment “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure
thereon are . . . contrary to the public interest”).
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where it is politically feasible. Thirteen of the existing state-based exchanges
(plus the District of Columbia) were established pursuant to legislation.39 The
legislative route would lend political legitimacy to the new exchanges and
could increase buy-in thanks to deeper stakeholder engagement.
There are downsides to seeking legislation, however. For one thing, the
legislative calendar imposes restrictions on when states can act. As described
earlier, the legislatures of the vast majority of the states without their own
exchanges will be out of session by the time the Supreme Court is expected to
rule. Even if the decision is released earlier and a few more states are still in
session, there will not be much time for significant debate.
States could consider exchange legislation during a special session, though
such sessions are rare in most states. In ten of the thirty-four states that lack
exchanges, only the governor is authorized to call a special session. Legislative
majorities of two-thirds or three-fourths are required in sixteen states. The
other eight require straight majorities, majorities of both political parties in
both chambers, or agreement between legislative leaders.40 These are high
thresholds under normal circumstances, never mind on an issue as divisive as
the ACA.
Even if the legislative calendar coincided with the timing of the ruling, the
legislative process affords opponents many opportunities to block an exchange.
Supporters generally need to win support in multiple committees in multiple
chambers, whereas opponents succeed by winning at just one of these
junctures. Legislative resistance to establishing an exchange could be intense.
After all, many of these thirty-four states could not pass exchange legislation in
the first place because of their resistance to the ACA.41
But political opposition to an exchange may not be insurmountable.
Republicans in some states have safely supported state control of exchanges by
framing control in terms of facilitating market competition, resisting federal
control, and supporting private rather than public insurance.42 In fact, between
September 2010 (when California created the first state-based exchange) and
March 2013 (when New Mexico created the last one), twenty-two states held
floor votes on twenty-seven bills, and these bills received support from an
average of forty-two percent of Republican state legislators.43 Even in ultraconservative Idaho, fifty-three percent of Republicans voted to retain control of
39.

David K. Jones, Katharine W. V. Bradley & Jonathan Oberlander, Pascal’s Wager: Health
Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the Republican Dilemma, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
97, 98 (2014).

40.

Special Sessions, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state
-legislatures/special-sessions472.aspx [http://perma.cc/AM2F-G8WU].

41.

Jones et al., supra note 39, at 98.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 106-07.
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its exchange.44 The vast majority of those legislators were re-elected in 2014,
despite threats from Tea Party challengers.45
Moreover, the growing number of Republicans working to expand
Medicaid suggests that state-run exchanges can receive bipartisan support
when the alternative is a large coverage gap and the loss of large amounts of
federal support.46 Prior to King, Republicans faced very little pressure to
support exchanges, since they expected that state residents would get tax
credits with or without a state-based exchange. If that expectation proves
unfounded, many Republicans might drop their resistance—particularly in
those twelve states that chose to expand Medicaid even though they did not
create an exchange.47
Nonetheless, the intensity of the opposition to the ACA should not be
underestimated. All but seven of the uncooperative states are led by Republican
governors, and Delaware is the only state with both a Democratic governor and
legislature. Many of the Republicans elected in 2014 campaigned on their
ardent opposition to Obamacare.48 It will be very difficult for them to vote for
anything resembling a fix to the law they despise.49
Executive Order Option
In those states where it’s not possible to secure new legislation, proceeding
by executive order may offer a promising alternative. In principle, at least,
exchanges could be established quickly, unilaterally, and regardless of whether
the legislature is in session. Indeed, three states—Kentucky, New York, and
Rhode Island—established their exchanges by executive order.50
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But it is unclear how many governors have the legal authority to create
exchanges. Under HHS’s Blueprint, governors must identify a law or
regulation authorizing the executive creation of an exchange.51 Governors may,
however, be able to push the point. Although HHS requires the authorizing
law to be clear on its face or to have been construed by state legal counsel, the
Obama administration is unlikely—especially after King—to question a
governor’s judgment that she has the authority to establish an exchange.
Again, however, there are downsides. Executive orders may lack buy-in
from key stakeholders, can provoke legislative backlash or legal challenge, and
can easily be undone by subsequent governors. Plus, the option is off the table
in at least eight states whose legislatures have forbidden any ACA
implementation without legislative involvement.52 Arizona is the most recent,
passing legislation in April 2015 prohibiting any state personnel or resources
being used to “enforce, administer, or cooperate” with the ACA.53
Proceeding via executive order may also limit the type of entity that can
operate the exchange. An exchange can either be a “governmental agency or
nonprofit entity that is established by a State,” but governors may need
additional legislation authorizing them to create non-profit or a quasigovernmental organizations. They could always house an exchange within an
existing state agency, including a health or insurance department.54 Kentucky
has taken this approach, and its exchange has been widely lauded.55 But such
exchanges would be subject to government hiring and procurement rules,
which slows the process down and limits flexibility (though the exchange
would not need to create a governance board).56
Regulatory Option
A third option may be available for those states that are unable or unwilling
to establish exchanges through legislation or executive order. State insurance
commissioners with sufficient constitutional and statutory authority could try
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to establish an exchange on their own.57 Although HHS’s Blueprint currently
requires states provide the signature of the governor or a designee, it could be
amended to enable insurance commissioners to move ahead without explicit
gubernatorial support.
Mississippi’s insurance commissioner already tried this approach in 2013.
Although HHS rejected the commissioner’s application, it did not question his
authority to establish an exchange. The basis for HHS’s denial, instead, was
Governor Phil Bryant’s threat to block any cooperation between the insurance
commissioner’s exchange and the state’s Medicaid program.58
Insurance commissioners won’t be able go it alone in every state, but they
may be able to press ahead in some. 9 states with federally facilitated exchanges
have independently elected insurance commissioners.59 Of these, only Montana
has a specific prohibition against ACA implementation without legislative
action, and only Delaware has a Democratic governor. The seven remaining
Republican governors have resisted the ACA and may obstruct any transition
to a state-based exchange, much like Governor Bryant did in Mississippi. But
some of these governors might allow their insurance commissioners to move
forward; they might even welcome this option as providing a way to avoid a
coverage gap without having to go on record as supporting the ACA.
Functionality
Legal authority alone will be inadequate. States that wish to establish their
own exchanges post-King will also have to assure that the exchanges can
function properly. The 2015 Blueprint application outlines fourteen functions
that a state-based exchange needs to perform. Pulling together a new exchange
from scratch would be unmanageable and cost-prohibitive for most states,
especially in a compressed timeframe.
But states can contract out much of the work. The ACA gives HHS
considerable discretion to allocate exchange responsibilities between the states
and the federal government. In particular, the ACA allows state exchanges to
contract its functions out to an “eligible entity,” which includes a state
57.
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Medicaid agency or state-incorporated entity. As long as a state designates a
“governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a State” to be
the exchange, the states will have considerable flexibility to outsource exchange
functions.
Technology
The most challenging task will likely be acquiring the technology to run a
functional exchange. Perhaps the most straightforward option for states would
be to work closely with the private contractors that currently run
HealthCare.gov. Those contractors are incorporated under state law, even
though they work for the federal government.60 Creative use of contracting
authority, for example, allowed Idaho and New Mexico, each of which
established its own exchange, to use HealthCare.gov to run enrollment for the
2014 plan year. (Idaho transitioned to its own website in 2015.)61 Similarly,
Nevada and Oregon are now considered “[f]ederally supported state-based
marketplaces” after trying and failing to develop their own technology.62 States
could also consider following Maryland’s example. After its exchange failed,
Maryland overhauled its website using technology imported from the
successful Connecticut exchange.63
States that wish to avoid HealthCare.gov may be able to work directly with
IT vendors. One company, for example, claims that it can create a new statebased marketplace in 60 days with no need for the state to cover any upfront
costs.64 It is not yet clear whether private contractors in fact have the capacity
to move so expeditiously. Given the difficulties in establishing state-based
exchanges and HealthCare.gov, it seems safe to assume that any transition
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requiring coordination between contractors and state governments will be rife
with confusion and delays.
The ACA also gives states the option of establishing regional exchanges,
which could enable states to work together to develop the needed
functionality.65 The law and subsequent regulations afford states considerable
flexibility in crafting regional exchanges, as long as they meet the same
standards as the state-based exchanges.66 So far, the states have shown little
appetite for creating regional exchanges, perhaps because coordinating across
state lines can be challenging. Nonetheless, regional exchanges might be an
option for states that are unable or unwilling to proceed on their own.
Alternatively, a state could simply designate a federally facilitated exchange
as a state-based exchange, either through legislation or executive order.67 This
approach would obviate most of the practical difficulties in establishing an
exchange, making it an especially attractive option for states that wish to get
exchanges up and running immediately. But the approach raises at least two
legal questions. First, for a state to establish an exchange, must a state do more
than merely deem HealthCare.gov to be state-established? Perhaps not,
especially given HHS’s wide latitude to define what counts as establishment.68
But the ACA does distinguish between the act of “elect[ing]” to create a statebased exchange and actually “establish[ing]” the exchange,69 suggesting (albeit
weakly) that the act of establishment may require something more than a
naked designation.
Second, the ACA requires a state-based exchange to be “a governmental
agency or nonprofit entity that is established by the state.”70 Does the phrase
“that is established by the state” apply only to “nonprofit entit[ies]”—that is,
the last antecedent?71 Or does it also apply to “governmental agenc[ies],” too?
The statute is ambiguous on this precise point. Although HHS could resolve
that ambiguity to allow a federal agency to house state-based exchanges, such a
construction of the statutory requirement could come in for legal challenge.
States that wish to delegate exchange functions to HealthCare.gov, but which
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hope to put their exchanges on a surer legal footing, may opt, instead, to
partner directly with the contractors that run the federal exchanges.
Other Functions
Those states that transition to running their own exchanges will also have
to assume plan management functions, such as certifying qualified health
plans, monitoring compliance with relevant laws, and collecting data on
premiums and benefits. Such oversight is a natural role for states, which
historically have taken the lead in regulating health insurance. Indeed, fourteen
of the states that refused to establish exchanges do plan management anyway.
If the other twenty states likewise took some responsibility over plan
management, state-level stakeholders could work with local regulators familiar
with and invested in the specific cultural and market conditions of each state.
Political conservatives may wish to take the opportunity to craft state-level
exchanges that are open to all insurers that meet basic requirements—the socalled “clearinghouse model”—especially now that studies have found that the
clearinghouse model is associated with lower premiums than the “active
purchaser” model employed on HealthCare.gov and some state exchanges.72
Other aspects of running a state-based exchange will not be as
straightforward. For example, states will need to assume responsibilities for
consumer and stakeholder engagement, including opening call centers,
developing navigator standards, and defining the role of agents and brokers.
The federal government already performs some of these functions on behalf of
states that rejected establishing an exchange, however, and could continue
doing so. In the meantime, HHS could conditionally approve exchanges while
states figure out these details.
Financing
Even if states navigate deadlines, provide authority, and achieve necessary
functionality, they will have to figure out how to pay for their exchanges. Two
elements of the ACA complicate the financing question. First, starting this
year, state-based exchanges must be financially self-sustaining. Second, HHS
is no longer permitted to award grants to subsidize the construction of state
exchanges.73
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The absence of grant funding is an especially serious problem. The sixteen
states (plus the District of Columbia) that established their own exchanges
each received an average of $250 million in grants (including planning, level 1
and level 2 establishment grants), with California spending more than one
billion dollars. Nevada spent the least, receiving just $100 million.74
Establishing a state-based exchange need not be so expensive, particularly if a
state relies on HealthCare.gov. Many states spent so much because they were
trying to function as active purchasers and engage in significant consumer
outreach and education.75 A state could meet the requirements of the law with a
less ambitious approach and a bare-bones staff.
Even so, an exchange will be costly, and some of the money will likely have
to come from the state’s general treasury. The seven partnership states have the
advantage of already receiving an average of $65 million in exchange planning
and establishment grants from the federal government.76 Much of this money
is already accounted for, however, and will not help with long-term
sustainability. States could also direct money they collect in user fees to finance
their exchanges. In 2015, for example, HealthCare.gov mainly (but not
exclusively) financed its operations through assessments on participating
health plans of 3.5% of their premiums.77 New state-based exchanges could
adopt similar assessments, and much of the money could flow through the
exchanges right back to the contractors that had been providing services to the
federally facilitated exchange. Appropriating general funds and imposing user
fees may require legislative approval, even in states relying on an executive
order for authority.
c o n c lu s io n
A ruling for the plaintiffs in King v. Burwell would be enormously
disruptive for millions of people and for state insurance markets. There are no
good options for either the Obama administration or the states. Together, they
can apply some band-aids, but they cannot stop the bleeding. We nonetheless
urge policymakers to prepare their contingency plans now, well in advance of a
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ruling. Without plans in place, they may find themselves with fewer options
still, and even less time to implement them.
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